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Abstract 
This article is about the future of sociology, as transformations in the digital and biological sciences lay 
Đlaiŵ to the disĐipliŶe͛s juƌisdiĐtioŶal Đlaiŵ oǀeƌ ͚the soĐial.͛ Rather than analyse the specific of these 
transformations, however, the focus of the paper is on how a narrative of methodological crisis is 
sustained in sociology, and on how such a narrative conjures very particular disciplinary futures. 
Through a close reading of some texts, the paper makes two central claims: (1) that a surprisingly 
conventional urged towards disciplinary reproduction can sometimes animate accounts of sociologǇ͛s 
crisis; (2) that these same accounts are often haunted by a hidden metaphorical architecture centred on 
biology, vitality, and images of life. The basic claim of the paper is that foregrounding this image of life 
might offer a less reproductively conventional way of understanding –and intervening in – the 
ŵethodologiĐal ͚Đƌisis͛ at stake. Drawing on my own recent work on urban stress, and on the work of 
Stefan Helmreich (2011, 2016), the papeƌs eŶds ǁith a speĐulatiǀe Đall foƌ a ͚liŵit soĐiologǇ͛ – a form of 
attention that could expand rather than contract the methodological and ontological potential of the 
present. At the heart of the paper is a hope that thinking with such a limit may help us to imagine a less 
deadening future than that on offer from a canonised discipline cathected by endless crisis-talk. 
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Introduction  
In 2007, Mike Savage and Roger Burrows published a paper Đalled ͚The CoŵiŶg Crisis of Empirical 
Sociology,͛ which would go on to become one of the landmark British sociology papers of the decade.i 
The paper was published in Sociology, the foremost publication of the British Sociological Association 
(BSA), and centred on what Savage and Burrows took to be a transformational moment in the 
generation, collection, and analysis of sociological data—as that data was becoming more and more 
entangled in new digital technologies, and the private institutions that controlled them. The paper 
asked: what happens to the methodological jurisdiction of academic sociology, when central nodes of 
the digital and algorithmic economy can gather infinitely more social data, in in an infinitesimally smaller 
amount of time, than even the most dedicated team of university-based sociologists?  
The authors described a salutary incident in 2005, when Mike Savage, then Professor of 
“oĐiologǇ at the UŶiǀeƌsitǇ of MaŶĐhesteƌ, ǁeŶt to a ŵethods festiǀal oƌgaŶised ďǇ the UK͛s EĐoŶoŵiĐ 
and Social Research Council (ESRC). Savage was presenting on a social network analysis that mapped the 
ties and affiliations of hundreds of people working in voluntary organisations. After his talk, he bumped 
into a man who was also interested in social network analysis – but who was not, as it turned out, an 
academic. In fact, this man worked for the research arm of a large telecommunications company; and as 
Mike Savage talked to him, it became apparent that, in putting together his own social network studies, 
the man had access to the records of every phone call, ever made, by everyone connected to his 
ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s Ŷetǁoƌk. Coŵpaƌed to “aǀage͛s oǁŶ studǇ of ϯϮϬ people, this ŵaŶ, aŶd the laƌge 
commercial organisation he worked for, were sitting on a data mine of, literally, billions of social ties. 
͚This is data,͛ laŵeŶted “aǀage aŶd Buƌƌoǁs, ͚ǁhiĐh dǁaƌfs aŶǇthiŶg that aŶ aĐadeŵiĐ soĐial sĐieŶtist 
Đould gaƌŶeƌ͛ ;ϮϬϬϳ: ϴϴϳͿ. Woƌse: ͚it ǁas data that did Ŷot ƌeƋuiƌe a speĐial effoƌt to ĐolleĐt, ďut ǁas the 
digital by-pƌoduĐt of the ƌoutiŶe opeƌatioŶs of a laƌge Đapitalist iŶstitutioŶ͛ ;iďid.Ϳ.  
How are we to think about the future of sociology in the face of such challenges? How, indeed, 
should we imagine that future not only in the face of these particular developments, but in relation to a 
much wider suite of more-or-less ͚soĐial͛ transformations, now taking place in the digital and biological 
sciences? (Marres, 2012; Meloni, 2014). This is the question that preoccupies Savage and Burrows – and 
it preoccupies me too. But not because I think it is necessarily still worth answering (or that it is actually 
answerable). My interest is in what being preoccupied by such questions actually does to and for the 
discipline of sociology; in other words, I am concerned with how we should think about an intellectual 
practice, a discipline, and a set of scholars, for whom such fundamental questions of jurisdiction and 
purpose are now coming into view. So, rather than offering yet another analysis of soĐiologǇ͛s ;ƌeĐediŶgͿ 
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landscape, in this paper I want to focus on how sociologists have actually thought, narrated, figured and 
become anxious about this same terrain. That may look narrow, and a bit parochial. But in what follows I 
will try to show that it might help us to think the history and present of ͚discipline͛ ŵoƌe geŶeƌallǇ. And I 
will do that in two ways: first, and this will remain largely implicit in what follows, I want to draw 
attention to what I call, folloǁiŶg Lee EdelŵaŶ ;ϮϬϬϰͿ, the ͚ƌepƌoduĐtiǀe futuƌisŵ͛ of contemporary 
sociology; in using this term, my goal is to explore some ways of thinking about the methodological 
future of academic sociology without the gestures through which sociologists͛ try to reproduce 
themselves, and their institutions, and their methods, in the face of encroachment and crisis (see e.g. 
Holmwood, 2010). What would come into view if we could imagine the future of sociological practice in 
the absence of a will to disciplinary reproduction? Second, and this is very much on the surface of what 
follows, I will show that there is another figure haunting these discussions – which has not yet been 
made explicit, but which may nonetheless offer different resources for thinking about the temporal 
contingency of sociology and sociological method – and this is the figure of life. In what follows, I argue 
that a sense of life – its precarity, its fragility, its ebbing-away – sits at the centre of these discussions, 
though it is rarely acknowledged there. My basic goal is to show how explicitly re-centering this 
discussion on life, or more accurately on the limits of life (cf. Helmreich, 2011), might open up a more 
compelling framework for making sense of precisely the moment of transformation that these 
discussions are trying to understand.  
What would happen if we re-read reflections on methodological crisis as ways of thinking about 
soĐiologǇ͛s ƌelatioŶship to liǀiŶg thiŶgs? What if ǁe ƌe-diagnosed what is, for Mike Savage (2010), an 
oŶgoiŶg ƋuestioŶ iŶ the ͚politiĐs of ŵethod͛ as, ƌatheƌ, a slaŶted iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ iŶ the politiĐs of life ;Đf. 
Rose, 2007)? In the first and second sections of this paper, I approach these questions through in-depth 
readings of two influential accounts of the present and future of sociological method – one by Mike and 
Savage and Roger Burrows (2007), introduced above, and another by Les Back (2012). I will show that 
these accounts are, in fact, both shot-through with strikingly vital, biological, and organic imagery. My 
central arguments in these sections is that this imagery is not incidental, nor is it merely illustrative of the 
(in fact) quite different desires of the two sets of authors. I argue, rather, that the parapraxical emergence 
of biological language and metaphor in these texts, at this precise moment, should be read as the 
registration of a certain kind of ontological anxiety – an emergent and still unarticulated sense that very 
different ways of knowing the social world, and of intervening in it, are just over the horizon. In the third 
and fourth sections, I attach this observation to ŵǇ oǁŶ eŵpiƌiĐal iŶteƌest iŶ ͚life͛ as a ĐoŶĐeƌn for 
sociological method, and here I will reflect on my current work, which is broadly about the bio-political 
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entanglements of urban stress in contemporary megacities. Situating myself in a very specific sociological 
scene, and drawing especially on the work of the anthropologist Stefan Helmreich (2011, 2016), I will 
argue that it is less a sociology of reproductive futures and more a limit sociology that can guide us through 
this ongoing moment of methodological transformation. It is worth noting that there are two different 
objects sliding across one another in this paper, but perhaps never quite meeting – one concerns the life 
of sociology, the other the sociology life.ii To be clear, it is not my claim that one follows necessarily from 
the other. But having identified it, my method in what follows is to take the metaphorical infrastructure 
of sociological crisis-talk very seriously. How would things be different if we started to understand the 
biosocial metaphors that suffuse these texts as not only metaphors – indeed, perhaps not as metaphors 
at all?  
More than twenty years ago, in this journal, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose (1997) offered a 
set of theses about the forms of articulation and voice in which social thought has moved, historically, 
and through which social problems emerge. Towards the end of their paper, Osborne and Rose asked 
how we might make sense of the articulations of social thought in our own era, at a moment in which 
͚͞soĐietǇ͟ is Ŷo loŶgeƌ soĐial, oƌ, at least, Ŷot soĐial iŶ Ƌuite the saŵe ǁaǇ͛ ;ϭϵϵϳ:ϭϬϬͿ. Their proposal 
was to attend to the ethical and practical inventiveness of contemporary social technicians, and the 
foƌŵs of ͚liǀiŶg thought͛ that those techniques articulate: ͚one learns more about the conditions under 
which we have come to be able to understand our experience as ͞social,͛͟ Osborne and Rose argued, by 
atteŶdiŶg to aŶ ͚applied ethiĐs of iŶǀestigatioŶ aŶd iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ,͛ rather than ruŵiŶatiŶg oŶ ͚ďiogƌaphies 
aŶd sĐhools, oƌ ďǇ ƌeĐoŶstƌuĐtiŶg a theoƌetiĐal ĐaŶoŶ͛ ;iďid.: ϭϬϭͿ. IŶ this papeƌ, I will pick up the threads 
of this suggestion. I will explore what a new ethics of investigation, in this mode, might look like, and I 
will ask if it cannot yet ŵoǀe us ďeǇoŶd the ƌepƌoduĐtiǀe futuƌes of ͚Đƌisis͛ aŶd ͚ĐaŶoŶ.͛ 
 
Touching the nerve  
Let me return to the Savage and Burrows paper with which I began. Certainly, the ͚Coming Crisis͛ paper 
does a lot of interesting things in not much space. In one reading, its contribution turns on an argument 
about the epistemic designs of commercial institutions under late capitalism (what Savage and Burrows 
Đall, afteƌ Nigel Thƌift, ͚kŶoǁiŶg Đapitalisŵ͛Ϳ. What does it ŵeaŶ, theǇ ask, ǁheŶ the pƌiǀatelǇ-owned 
digital fallout of eǀeƌǇdaǇ iŶteƌaĐtioŶ tuƌŶs out to ďe ouƌ pƌiŵaƌǇ ŵeaŶs foƌ ͚thiŶkiŶg the eǀeƌǇdaǇ͛ 
(Thrift, 2005: cited in Savage and Burrows, 2007)? This is a really interesting question, but Savage and 
Buƌƌoǁs doŶ͛t ƌeallǇ go iŶto it. IŶ fact, their overall focus is not so much on capital but on method—and, 
maybe more specifically, on the provenance of method (ibid.: 886). Savage and Burrows are attentive in 
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their paper to questions of methodological jurisdiction, including (and they are of course alive to thisiii) 
the very active politics of boundary-policing through which jurisdiction gets made. As they point out: for 
all its theoretical desires, British sociology actually survived the twentieth century mostly by virtue of it 
its methods (ibid.: 888). Indeed, it is the research technologies of sociology – the questionnaire, the 
interview, the community study – which have garnered whatever limited prestige the discipline now 
enjoys.  
 Hence the concern: massive social-data-gathering technologies, and the private interests that 
own them, which are, simultaneously, engines of digital capitalism, enablers of social interaction, and 
repositories of high-quality data on that interaction, clearly have limited interest in the data-resources 
or empirical skills of university-based sociologists. And if this analysis holds fairly obviously for 
quantitative sociology, it is no less a problem for qualitative methods: precisely because of how these 
same enterprises have recast social life, outmoded research tactics such as interviewing, life history, 
ethnography, etc.—i.e. the basic methodological ground of most contemporary British sociology—
cannot gƌasp the ͚ŵǇƌiad ŵoďilities, sǁitĐhes, tƌaŶsaĐtioŶs aŶd fluidities͛ iŶ ǁhiĐh ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ soĐial 
life takes plaĐe ;ϮϬϬϳ: ϴϵϰͿ. IŶteƌǀieǁiŶg is all ǁell aŶd good foƌ ͚ŵid-range typifications of social 
aĐtioŶs͛— but is not especially helpful ͚for generating sophisticated understandings of the diverse 
weltanschauung that pertain in contemporary societies͛ (ibid.).  
Well. How should we read this paper now – ten years after its first publication? In 2014, Savage 
and Burrows themselves (now writing as Burrows and Savage) published a follow-up in a new journal, 
Big Data and Society—the subsequent emergence of which, they are not slow to notice, at least counts 
as part vindication. As they point out, what is perhaps most remarkable about their original paper is how 
commonplace its arguments have since become: what was once ͚iŶŶoǀatiǀe aŶd iŵpoƌtaŶt͛ has siŶĐe 
ďeĐoŵe ͚a pƌettǇ ŵaiŶstƌeaŵ positioŶ, Ŷot just iŶ soĐiologǇ ďut also aĐƌoss the ĐogŶate soĐial sĐieŶĐes 
ŵoƌe geŶeƌallǇ͛ (Burrows and Savage, 2014: 1)iv. This is surely true. But another reading would say that a 
great deal of what is stake here (none of this will surprise nuanced scholars of jurisdiction, such as 
Savage and Burrows) is a certain kind of jostling for methodological, conceptual and institutional ground, 
among a particular generation of British sociologists, at specific moments in their individual careers. One 
way to read the 2007 paper, then—including the figures it critiques in passing, the scale of its reception 
aŶd iŶflueŶĐe, its authoƌs͛ atteŵpts to ƌead it iŶ ƌetƌospeĐt, the ŵethodologiĐal interventions that came 
after it, the (often strikingly sharp) debates around those interventions—would be as a familiar, anxious 
labour of legacy-leaving and career-making, as well as the larger work of discipline-shaping that is a 
necessary condition of this labour. v And this all taking place among a group of (mostly male) senior 
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sociologists, either then inhabiting, or coming to inhabit, professorial chairs at one or more of the self-
consciously elite departments in the UK. Reproduction, we might say, sits at the centre of this scene.vi As 
Mike Savage himself points out elsewhere: the history of a discipline like sociology needs to be 
uŶdeƌstood iŶ ͚a ŵessǇ, Đoŵpetitiǀe ĐoŶteǆt, ǁheƌeďǇ the ƌoles of diffeƌeŶt kiŶds of iŶtelleĐtuals, 
technical experts, and social groups aƌe at stake͛ ;ϮϬϭϬ: ϮϯϳͿ. It seems important, from such a 
perspective, to read interventions around the ͚Coming Crisis͛ paper not only as analyses of the counting-
work done by individual sociologists (quantitative or otherwise)—but as claims about the kind of 
sociology that is, in the future, going to count.   
But ǁhat is ŵost stƌikiŶg to ŵe aďout Mike “aǀage aŶd ‘ogeƌ Buƌƌoǁs͛ ƌetƌospeĐtiǀe ƌe-reading 
of their paper, ͚The CoŵiŶg Cƌisis of EŵpiƌiĐal “oĐiologǇ,͛ is that they root its legacy in the second half of 
its ĐeŶtƌal ĐoŵpouŶd: ͚eŵpiƌiĐal soĐiologǇ.͛ Wheƌeas the oďjeĐt that I fiŶd ŵoƌe pƌesĐieŶt aŶd urgent, 
but which is nonetheless largely neglected (maybe even part repudiated) in this later memorialization, is 
the first half of the title: the ͚coming Đƌisis.͛ IŶdeed, I ǁaŶt to saǇ that it is this feeliŶg of Đƌisis—and not a 
debate about the collection of data—that foƌŵs the papeƌ͛s gƌouŶd, aŶd aĐĐouŶts foƌ its iŶflueŶĐe. The 
ǁoƌd ͚Đƌisis͛ itself, iŶ this ƌeadiŶg, is Ŷot iŶĐideŶtal. Not oŶlǇ is it a long-sustained trope in sociological 
lamentations about the state of sociology itself (see Gouldner, 1971), ďut the speĐifiĐ teƌŵ, ͚Đƌisis,͛ of 
course recalls histories of pathology and disease: in this scenario, the crisis, as the sociologist Robert 
Holton reminds us, ŵaƌks ͚a paƌtiĐulaƌ stage iŶ the deǀelopŵeŶt of aŶ illŶess ǁhiĐh is deĐisiǀe foƌ the 
futuƌe. The ƌesolutioŶ of the ͞Đƌisis͟ ǁill deteƌŵiŶe ǁhetheƌ the ͞patieŶt͟ ǁill ƌeĐoǀeƌ oƌ die͛ ;1987: 
504).   
Recover or die. Does it over-read these texts to say that the very life of sociology is at stake 
here? I doŶ͛t thiŶk that it does. For example, noting that the discipline is far from the critical vortex that 
it was in the 1960s and 1970s, Burrows and Savage, in their 2014 paper, suggest that there is scope to 
re-thiŶk the assuŵptioŶ ͚that the disĐipliŶe of soĐiologǇ ǁas ďouŶd to eǆist͛ ;ϮϬϭϰ: ϮͿ. What theǇ 
describe is thus not simply a parallel world of quasi-sociological work in the commercial sector, but in 
faĐt a ͚ŵajoƌ Ŷail iŶ the ĐoffiŶ of aĐademic sociological claims to jurisdiction over knowledge of the 
soĐial͛ as such (2014: 2). And what is needed in the face of such existential threat is not an academic 
deďate, ďut ƌatheƌ ͚a soƌt of soĐiologiĐal Đall to aƌŵs͛—a ĐaŵpaigŶ that ǁill ͚ƌeiŶǀigoƌate a sociological 
iŵagiŶatioŶ͛ foƌ the tǁeŶtǇ fiƌst ĐeŶtuƌǇ ;Buƌƌoǁs aŶd “aǀage, ϮϬϭϰ: Ϯ-3). The authors evoke the same 
iŵageƌǇ iŶ the faĐe of ĐƌitiƋue: ͚ǁhateǀeƌ the ƋualitǇ of ouƌ aƌtiĐle ŵight haǀe ďeeŶ,͛ theǇ saǇ to oŶe 
ƌespoŶdeŶt, ͚ǁe ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ seeŵed to haǀe touĐhed a Ŷeƌǀe͛ ;“aǀage aŶd Buƌƌoǁs, ϮϬϬϵ: ϳϲϰͿ.   
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 It seems to me that such imagery—existential, vigorous, nervous— reveals important stakes of 
this discussion; that an intense collective anxiety about sociology's life, about the prospect of the 
discipline as both a lively and a lifely endeavour, lurks below the surface of these methodological 
lamentations, and the anxious disciplinary atmosphere into which they have been received. Savage and 
Burrows are insistent that theirs is an intervention in the ͚politiĐs of ŵethod͛ ;ϮϬϭϰ: ϰͿ, ďut as I aƌgued iŶ 
the introduction, we would do better to read their paper as a statement about the politics of life in and 
around sociology today. When I draw attention to a politics of life, I mean it (as I think Savage and 
Burrows mobilize it, albeit implicitly) as an urgent attention to the possibility of any kind of lively, 
animated, buoyant, sentient, sociological discipline—a discipline that is alive to, and sustained in, the 
material, digital, and technoscientific hubbub of contemporary social relation. But I also mean it (again, I 
think this is already in the work of Savage and Burrows, just not on the surface) in the rather crass sense 
of being alive. Which is to say, what I think we are really talking about here is the simultaneously 
institutional and existential politics of being any kind of vaguely sustainable intellectual enterprise—of 
being a discipline that, in the future, will have any methodological niche to call its own.  
In this paper, I take the work of Mike Savage and Roger Burrows very seriously. But I am working 
to diffƌaĐt it iŶ a paƌtiĐulaƌ ǁaǇ: I ǁaŶt to take the diagŶosis of ͚eŵpiƌiĐal Đƌisis͛ as a ǁaǇ iŶto thiŶkiŶg 
much more squarely about the vitality of sociology within the transformations of the present — 
transformations which, such a formulation already reminds us, are not only digital and computational, 
but are wrapped up in emergent forms of biology too. In so doing, I am trying to shift us beyond the 
reproductive futurism of British sociology, to ask if there are not less conventional registers in which we 
ŵight uŶdeƌstaŶd ǁhat͛s happeŶiŶg heƌe. I ǁaŶt to ask if ǁe ĐaŶŶot saǇ soŵethiŶg ďoldeƌ aďout ǁhat it 
might mean, for sociologists, when we somehow find ourselves touching a nerve.  
 
Life methods  
Perhaps the most compelling response to the ͚Coming Crisis͛ paper came from Les Back, Professor of 
“oĐiologǇ at Goldsŵith͛s College, iŶ a papeƌ that BaĐk puďlished fiǀe Ǉeaƌs lateƌ — this time in The 
Sociological Reviewvii. At the heaƌt of BaĐk͛s papeƌ, ͚Liǀe “oĐiologǇ͛ ;ϮϬϭϮͿ, is aŶ aƌguŵeŶt that ǁe aƌe 
indeed confronted by a new reality in the production and appreciation of social relations—a reality that 
is non-linear, emergent, processual, digital, mobile, and so on—but that the way to deal with these 
developments is not to play around at the edges of method; instead, and somewhat more directly, Back 
aƌgues that ͚theƌe aƌe soŵe aspeĐts of soĐiologiĐal pƌaĐtiĐe that ǁe Ŷeed to ďuƌǇ ;BaĐk, ϮϬϭϮ: ϮϬͿ. 
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Indeed, not only a burial, ďut fiƌst ͚aŶ autopsǇ oŶ dead soĐiologǇ͛ is Đalled foƌ — in order to eliminate 
pƌaĐtiĐes that aƌe ͚Ŷo loŶgeƌ ǀital͛ to the soĐiologiĐal eŶteƌpƌise ;iďidͿ.   
What folloǁs iŶ Les BaĐk͛s papeƌ is a ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ of post-mortem and reanimation, in which 
Back ƌoots out ͚lifeless ĐoŶĐeptioŶs,͛ ͚zoŵďie ĐoŶĐepts͛ and (in a phrase borrowed from Albion Small), 
͚fossil faĐts͛ ;iďid.: ϮϭͿ. ͚Dead soĐiologǇ͛ saǇs BaĐk, is ͚oďjeĐtifǇiŶg, Đoŵfoƌtaďle, diseŶgaged aŶd 
paƌoĐhial͛; ǁhat is Ŷeeded, ďǇ ĐoŶtƌast, is a ͚ǀital soĐiologiĐal futuƌe͛ — which will come from a kind of 
embodied, multi-sensory openness to the mobility of social life, and from a renewed attention to the 
craft through which that life gets registered (ibid,: 23). Such modes of attention, Back argues, are 
neĐessaƌǇ foƌ pƌoduĐiŶg ͚ǀital teǆts,͛ ǁhiĐh ǁill Ŷot oŶlǇ help us to ďƌiŶg soĐiologǇ to life, ďut aĐtuallǇ 
help sociologists — as, Ŷoǁ, ͚oƌgaŶiĐ iŶtelleĐtuals͛— ďoth ͚to liǀe,͛ aŶd eǀeŶ to ͚sustaiŶ the life of thiŶgs͛ 
(ibid.: 34, 360).  
There are many things that might be taken from this proposal.viii And if I am riding roughshod 
over the subtlety of his paper, I want to stress that I am much in agreement with BaĐk͛s diagŶosis of the 
intensely stultifying nature of much sociological work, and especially the relationship of his diagnosis to 
the preferences of sociological journals that imagine themselves, somehow, the bearers of prestige. But 
again, I want to focus on the rhetorical undercurrent, and to draw attention to how Back constructs his 
argument through images of living and dying: Fossils. Zombies. Autopsies. Burials. Organic intellectuals. 
Vital teǆts. LiǀelǇ thiŶgs. AŶ iŵpetus foƌ ͚assassiŶatioŶ.͛ A desiƌe ͚to liǀe.͛ What ĐaŶ ǁe saǇ aďout the 
stakes of such a vocabulary? It is possible, of course, to read too much into metaphor – both here and in 
the discussion above.ix It is equally possible that moving from a particular metaphorical architecture to a 
claim that there is  gain in reading these debates as debates that are also about the life and death of the 
discipline is a stretch too far. But the central gambit of this paper is that there is no coincidence in the 
fact that the most pressing empirical problem in sociology, in a moment of transformation and crisis, 
turns out to be, at the same time, a question of life. What strikes me as strange, rather, is that these 
images of life, which are intended to underwrite a reanimation of the present, nonetheless seems so 
peĐuliaƌlǇ… lifeless. Because it is remarkable to ŵe that a ͚liǀe soĐiologǇ,͛ as ĐoŵpelliŶg a ƌespoŶse to 
the ͚Đƌisis͛ as it suƌelǇ is, is Ŷot a soĐiologǇ of flesh aŶd ďlood; it iŶǀolǀes oƌgaŶiĐ iŶtelleĐtuals, ďut Ŷot 
organic subjects; it draws on sensory methods, but not biological ones; there are well-laid plans for 
autopsies and burials—but none for measuring vital signs.  
Let me offer two caveats at this point. First, there has of course been a great deal of discussion, 
in sociology and elsewhere, about rethinking intellectual practices as relations to and from living bodies 
Les Back, indeed, has made major contributions to drawing out the conceptual and methodological 
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heart of this discussion.x  But when I ask aďout ͚a soĐiologǇ of flesh aŶd ďlood,͛ my question is not so 
ŵuĐh aďout, foƌ eǆaŵple, the ďodǇ ͚as a politiĐal field͛ ;see BaĐk, ϮϬϭϯ; ϳϯ-76) but something much 
more viscerally interior, more densely cellular, than these kinds of analysis typically allow.  As Elizabeth 
WilsoŶ poiŶts out, ǁe haǀe latelǇ leaƌŶed to ďe astute aďout ͚the ďodǇ͛ iŶ soĐial aŶd Đultural theory, and 
yet we remain somewhat willfully ignorant about anatomy (2016: 49).  Second, when I call attention to a 
ĐeƌtaiŶ ͚lifelessŶess͛ iŶ this teǆt, I doŶ't ŵeaŶ this as aŶǇ kiŶd of aesthetiĐ judgeŵeŶt— I only mean to 
say that, in these papers, ͚life͛ seeŵs to ďe takeŶ as deteƌŵiŶate, aŶd as ďiŶaƌǇ, aŶd thus as aŶ oďjeĐt of 
adjudication. Which is to say, if I may add my own gloss, that these are analyses in which sociology 
soŵehoǁ ŵust ďe dead oƌ aliǀe; that it has a futuƌe oƌ it doesŶ͛t; that existence is sustained or 
quenched; that concepts are vital or fossilized; that the future is digital or analogue; that ͚kŶoǁiŶg 
Đapitalisŵ͛ ǁill put us out of ǁoƌk oƌ ŵake us ƌiĐh; that ǁe aƌe all, iŶ the fiŶal aŶalǇsis, siliĐoŶ oƌ ĐaƌďoŶ, 
possible or impossible, buried or resurrected, incorporated or zombified. This is what the image of life is 
made to do here: it not only adjudicates the future, but does so with reference only to a set of 
conventional taxonomies drawn from the recent past.  
And yet, as the anthropologist Stefan Helmreich (2011) reminds us, the theoretical object of 
ďiologǇ, ͚life,͛ has latelǇ ďeĐoŵe uŶŵooƌed. This is Ŷot to saǇ that the ĐoŶĐept of life has dissolǀed iŶto 
nothingness, but that the methodological and conceptual limits of life science—what Helmreich calls 
͚liŵit ďiologies͛— now push at the edges of what we think it might actually mean to be alive. By limit 
biologies, Helmreich means practices like astrobiology (the search for biological traces beyond earth) or 
oceanic microbiology (the study of deep-ocean microbial life) – i.e. endeavours that push at the edges of 
what biologists think is possible for sustaining vitality. At such limits, it is not simply that we find living 
thiŶgs oƌ oŶlǇ dead oŶes. It͛s that ǁhat ǁe Đoŵe iŶto contact with, what we encounter, and measure, 
and parse, actually expands our account of what life is, and what degrees of life might mean, in the first 
plaĐe. At the heaƌt of these pƌaĐtiĐes, saǇs HelŵƌeiĐh, life ͚ŵoǀes out of the doŵaiŶ of the giǀeŶ iŶto the 
contingent, into quotation marks, appearing not as a thing-in-itself but as something in the making in 
disĐouƌse aŶd pƌaĐtiĐe͛ ;ϮϬϭϭ: ϳϳϰͿ.  
Which is a useful reminder that when we fix on life – the theoretical object of biology – in our 
attempt to understand what's happening to the theoretical object of sociology, we find ourselves in 
difficult territory. In what follows, I want to explore this territory in parallel with Helmreich, who takes 
this development—this ŵoǀe ͚iŶto ƋuotatioŶ-ŵaƌks͛—not as an object of anxiety, but as a data-point. I 
especially ǁaŶt to thiŶk ǁith HelŵƌeiĐh͛s ŶotioŶ of a liŵit ďiologǇ, aŶd to ask ǁhat suĐh a ŶotioŶ ŵight 
do for the social sciences, at a moment when social life— now digital, developmental, embodied, 
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processual, mobile, and so on— seems to be, once again, on the movexi. Temporality is at the centre of 
this analysis: HelŵƌeiĐh͛s article, ͚ǁhat ǁas life?͛, is also included in his wider a set of essays concerned 
with (among other things) ͚geŶƌes of tiŵe͛– from the premonitionary time of the anthropocene, to 
soundwaves reverberating across time, to the simultaneous rapidity and languor of ocean time 
(Helmreich, 2016: 108). Which reminds us that if the ĐoŶĐept of life is ͚ǁeaƌiŶg aǁaǇ͛ aŶd ͚coming 
apart,͛ it is nonetheless doing so ǁhile eŶtaŶgled iŶ pƌaĐtiĐes that uŶpiĐk ͚the very difference between 
Ŷoǁ aŶd the futuƌe͛ (2016: 107-108, xiii, xx-xxii). In other words, to identify something with the category 
of the ͚ǁas͛ is not to condemn it to oblivion. To be crude, I am not here saying here that sociology is 
͚over,͛ ǁhateǀeƌ suĐh a Đlaiŵ Đould even mean. I am saying that theoretical objects and methodological 
practices – including ͚sociology͛; iŶĐludiŶg ͚the soĐial͛ – are co-produced with and through temporal 
relations that are specific even if they are not fixed, and that making better sense of those relations 
might help us to get some purchase on just what is going on with those same objects and practices, 
without necessarily shoring up a withered present. 
Where might we seek the limits of sociology then? What are the practices, objects and 
territories that are exploring, and pushing on, the limits of what we have called, and might continue to 
call, ͚soĐial͛ iŶ the fiƌst plaĐe? To oŶĐe agaiŶ paƌaphƌase Elizaďeth WilsoŶ ;ϮϬϭϲͿ: ŵight it ďe possiďle to 
think the social through vital (and even biological) agencies — but to do so while expanding, rather than 
contracting, the present moment of transformation? What might it mean to think the material present 
of sociology as a question of life, but to do so in the absence of a convention that takes biological data to 
be so determinedly binary — that takes biological concepts to be so ontologically inert?  
 
Be calm  
In March 2016, in its Rockefeller-spoŶsoƌed oŶliŶe ͚Cities͛xii section, the Guardian reported on a survey 
on the number of panic attacks experienced by people in different urban areas in the UK (Fleming, 
2016). The report and survey caught my attention for a number of reasons: first, they identified the 
cities of South Wales, where I live, as the most stressed in the country. In a table compiling the 
percentage of residents in a range of cities who reported a panic attack at least once a week, Swansea 
and Cardiff – the two largest cities in Wales, about 40 miles apart along the southern coast – occupied 
numbers 1 and 3 respectively (for contrast: London came a sanguine 13th). According to the survey, in 
Cardiff about 7% of residents experience a panic attack every week; in Swansea, the figure is over 8% 
(ibid.). There are of course many ways in which we might think the landscape of panic, panic attack, and 
panic disorder, in a story like this onexiii What particularly caught my attention, however, was how 
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skillfully the journalist, Amy Fleming, wove a relationship between city living and stress around this 
fiŶdiŶg: ͚it͛s Ŷo suƌpƌise,͛ Fleming wrote, ͚that uƌďaŶ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶts ĐaŶ ĐoŶtƌiďute to the oŶset of paŶiĐ 
disorder. Noise, jostling crowds, treacherous and painfully slow-moving traffic, lack of green, open 
spaces, filthy pollution, high crime rates and living costs, and social anonymity are some of the factors 
ĐitǇ dǁelleƌs saǇ ŵake theŵ uŶeasǇ͛ ;FleŵiŶg, ϮϬϭϲͿ. The aƌtiĐle goes oŶ to desĐƌiďe hoǁ aŶ iŶdiǀidual 
city-dǁelleƌ͛s brain mediates these relationships: activity in the amygdala is associated with city stress; 
an increase in the acidity level in synapses around the amygdala associates with this activity; and 
elevated levels of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the air increase the acid. A chain of associations begins to 
emerge: stress and jostling in the urban milieu, competition, traffic, poor air quality, carbon dioxide, 
brain aciditǇ, iŶĐƌeased aŵǇgdala aĐtiǀitǇ… panic.  
 But here was the most interesting thing of all: as I read on, it became apparent that the team 
who carried out the research were headed by the co-founders of an organization that was actually 
manufacturing a device to addresses the link between CO2 and panic attack – a device called ͚ďĐalŵ͛xiv. 
Bcalm is a small, inhaler-like object; it works by giving the urban dweller a space to expel her potentially 
stress-causing CO2-laden breath, and to inhale, in exchange, air that has been filtered by the device to 
have the CO2 leǀel of ͚foƌest aiƌ.͛ The bad air of the city goes out; clean, pure, forest air comes in:  
In effect, your air supply has been 'scrubbed' of high CO2… this CO2 'scrubbing' process is 
very safe, and is also used in anesthesia machines and in rebreathers used by divers. 
After about 6 or 7 breaths, the CO2 levels in your throat are back to a much lower level. 
This means your CO2 receptor now sends a message to your brain, saying "relax, it's 
okay". It feels as though you just stepped out into a forest, but you haven't needed to go 
outside..…You ĐaŶ Ŷoǁ get oŶ ǁith eŶjoǇiŶg Ǉouƌ daǇ, ǁithout ǁoƌƌǇiŶg aďout haǀiŶg 
another episode – after all, you didn't have an episode. Bcalm stopped your panic 
developing further. xv   
I want to pause, here, to acknowledge this one small artefact of what we might call ͚kŶoǁiŶg 
Đapitalisŵ͛, aŶd its kŶoǁledge of, as well as its proposed intervention in, the urban scene: how 
should we think about the affective, psychosocial and physiological weight of urban life in a world 
where a device like the bcalm makes a certain kind of neuropolitical and technosomatic sense? At 
stake here is a longstanding but still poorly understand ethnographic and historical object, which 
foƌ the sake of ĐoŶǀeŶieŶĐe I ǁill Đall ͚uƌďaŶ stƌess͛ — i.e. the idea that there is an 
epidemiologically significant relationship between urban living and mental ill-health, a claim that 
is in turn embedded in intellectual history that is woven through a very particular set of urban 
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affects, dispositions, and experiences (see Söderström et al., 2016). For the last couple of years, 
with my collaborators, I have been trying to think about urban stress in this way— to understand 
how urban stress, as a social, historical and physiological experience, has come to matter across a 
range of scientific and cultural practices (see Fitzgerald et al., 2016a, 2016b). My collaborators 
and I have especially been trying to think about the varied inheritances of urban ecology in that 
history, which we have tried to connect to contemporary work on the embodied stresses of 
urban experience, and on the city as a space in which it seems increasingly hard to disentangle an 
interior from an exterior, a citizen from her milieu, a brain from a street. Of course we have been 
working to describe this landscape because of its intrinsic importance. But we have also drawn on 
it as a space for thinking this through the methodological practices of the social sciences 
themselves –  and, in particular, the relationship of those practice to the technological and 
biological mutations in which they now find themselves.  
 It is worth recalling here that ͚the uƌďaŶ͛ has loŶg ďeeŶ aŶ eǆpeƌiŵeŶtal testiŶg-ground 
for sociological theory and method: perspectives as different from (indeed, hostile to) one 
another as human ecology (Faris et al., 1939), Marxist and critical theory (Lefebvre et al., 1996), 
poststructuralist work (Jameson, 1984), as well as broadly non-representational (Amin and Thrift, 
2002) and environmental approaches (Heynen et al., 2006), all at least partly took root in urban 
studies. In particular, the city has long been a testing-ground for a diverse range of scholars, from 
a range of disciplines and backgrounds, trying to figure out how the variously social and biological 
dimensions of human life might get into one another: we could easily make a spectrum with, on 
the one end, figures as unalike as Patrick Geddes͛s (see Welter 2002), Octavia Hill (1970 [1883]) 
and WEB DuBois (2003 [1906] – all of them, in one way or another, concerned ǁith ͚health͛ 
in/and the city (among their many other preoccupations of course) – and, on the other end, 
contemporary mainstream epidemiology, where scholars still draw on the work of figures like 
Louis Wirth to establish connections between city life, wellbeing and happiness (Okulicz-Kozaryn 
aŶd Mazelis, ϮϬϭϲͿ. As Oƌit HalpeƌŶ aŶd heƌ Đolleagues ƌeŵiŶd us, theƌe is ŶothiŶg Ŷeǁ iŶ ͚test-
ďed uƌďaŶisŵ,͛ a logiĐ of pƌaĐtiĐe iŶ the ǁhiĐh the ĐitǇ gets situated as a ͚deǀelopŵeŶt 
environment [for testing] the operability of new technologies, processes, or theories for large 
sǇsteŵs͛ ;ϮϬϭϯ: ϮϵϬͿ.  
It is precisely this strange, test-bedded nexus of social theory, biosocial relationality, and 
eǆpeƌiŵeŶt, that dƌaǁs ŵe to thiŶk the ͚eŵpiƌiĐal Đƌisis͛ of soĐiologǇ through the urban and 
through urban studies. It moves me to think the bcalm, for example, not simply as a by-product 
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of ͚kŶoǁiŶg Đapitalisŵ͛ ďut actually as a much more interesting assemblage of materials, spaces, 
affects, bodies, interests, and capitals—a device that has the central attribute of being able to 
stage, and to switch between, a politics of urban space, a sensation of panic, a measure of CO2, a 
dream of a forest, a moment of breath, an acid in a synapse, a panic in Swansea. And if we can 
incorporate a device like this, without great difficulty into long, tangled histories of thinking the 
social and biological through one another in urban space, then there is an important question 
implicit in that narrative, and which I am trying to make explicit here, about the precise social 
techniques and practices that are at stake in it, and how those techniques and practices may or 
may not get traced into the present, through what devices and economies, with what 
consequences, and for whoŵ. IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, I aŵ tƌǇiŶg to figuƌe out hoǁ ͚the soĐial͛ Đoŵes to 
matter in a device like the bcalm; and I am trying to answer that question, not by re-enacting a 
firm cut between these two, but by thinking through the, in fact, much less bifurcated history of 
urban sociology — a corpus so much more lively and vital, so much more risky and experimental, 
so much more weird, and animal, and panicked, than we often acknowledge.  
 
Limit sociology  
Is it not the case that, just as with the work of the astrobiologists described by Stefan Helmreich, 
we are not simply reaching the end of that well-ǁoƌŶ theoƌetiĐal oďjeĐt, ͚the soĐial,͛ Ŷoƌ aƌe ǁe 
only stood gawping at its contingency; rather we are beginning to get a firmer analytical hold of 
the objects and practices that might push at the edges of its current limit – objects and practices 
that help us to stretch it, and extend it, and maybe even then to seek new agencies and new 
assemblages on the other side of it? Might we not say then, and also in a way that is derivative of 
the limit biologies described by Helmreich, that these dilemmas signal no more than the 
emergence of a limit sociology – in other words, that they mark the emergence of a procedure, or 
a set of procedures, that actively expand the ontological terrain of what it might mean to be 
social in the first place? And might we not also then conclude, at the same time, that limit 
sociologies and limit biologies do not simply run parallel to one another, that they are in fact kin 
of a sort— and that, indeed, the most obviously proliferating agencies one quickly encounters 
beyond the bounds of reproductive-futuƌist soĐiologǇ aƌe pƌeĐiselǇ those ͚iŵploded eŶtities͛ 
already well identified by Donna Haraway, and which are as much assembled of ͚paƌtiĐulaƌ soƌts 
of histoƌiĐallǇ situated ŵaĐhiŶes͛ as theǇ aƌe of ͚histoƌiĐallǇ situated oƌgaŶisŵs͛ ;ϮϬϭϲ: ϭϬϰͿ?xvi 
My concern is that such entities will remain stubbornly invisible to a sociological practice that has 
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its eyes firmly fixed on the reproductive business-as-usual. At least it seems to me that some kind 
of limit-practice, or at least a practice that has trained itself to be attentive to limits, is going to 
be vital for, in one sense, getting to grips with the proliferation of non-obvious techniques and 
entities that do indeed ĐoŶstitute ͚soĐial͛ life todaǇ, and, in another sense, the actual 
ĐoŶtiŶuatioŶ of a ͚soĐial͛ sĐieŶĐe that has soŵe soƌt of claim to the analysis or understanding of 
these techniques and entities in the first place. At least I want to suggest what I have here called 
͚liŵit soĐiologǇ͛ should, ďe ĐeŶtƌal to the aŵďitioŶs of those foƌ ǁhoŵ such continuation seems 
to matter. 
Let me conclude with one final reflection: for the last couple of years, my collaborators 
and I, including colleagues at Fudan University in Shanghai,xvii have spent some time in the 
migrant-oriented new towns at the edges of that city, key sites in the social, technological and 
industrial momentum of contemporary China (Greenspan, 2014). Our project is a collaboration 
between a set of researchers based in Chinese and UK universities, trying to get some purchase 
on the mundane hassles of everyday migrant life in Shanghai, by drawing together a complex 
range of ethnographic and epidemiological methods, and then triangulating these into some 
thicker account of what that life is like (See Li and Rose, 2017; Richaud and Amin, in press). 
Although the precise relationships are complex and multifaceted, the status of being a migrant, 
with its attendant stresses and dislocations, has long been associated with poor urban mental 
health (Bhugra, 2004; Li et al., 2006). What is at stake in a city like Shanghai, then, still in the 
midst of an enormous rural to urban migration, is a complex and still not well understood 
assemblage of urbanisation, migration, and stress (but not only stress), which is taking place at 
the saŵe tiŵe as a ͚ďooŵ͛ iŶ psǇĐhologiĐal atteŶtioŶ, aŶd eǀeŶ iŶ new foƌŵs of ͚psǇĐhologiĐal 
goǀeƌŶaŶĐe,͛ iŶ ChiŶa ;YaŶg, ϮϬϭϳͿ. Without pathologizing or reducing this very varied and 
complicated experience, in our project we have been trying to think collectively about the politics 
of stress in migrant areas of Shanghai – and especially to think the sensory, social and biological 
sequelae of that stress; which is to say, the sequelae of competition and alienation, of uprooting 
and physical distance, of long hours and variable housing, of sometimes patchy and 
bureaucratically complex access to services, and so on. Our interest is in how migrant life in 
Shanghai gets incorporated – and, although the empirics of the study are still in progress, we are 
working to assemble a combination of ethnographic, epidemiological and digital methods, 
through which we might somehow trace the social life of the city through the body and brain of 
the stressed city dweller.  
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This is much too short an account of a complex endeavour. But I raise it here because I 
ǁaŶt to saǇ that, if I had oƌigiŶallǇ uŶdeƌstood this pƌojeĐt as a Ŷoǀel atteŵpt to ͚ĐoŶŶeĐt͛ the 
social and biological in an interesting and creative way, increasingly I have started to think of 
ǁhat ǁe͛ƌe doiŶg ;aŶd I aŵ aǁaƌe of the pƌeteŶĐe iŶǀolǀed iŶ this ĐoŵpaƌisoŶͿ as a kiŶd of ͚liŵit 
soĐiologǇ͛ – which is to say: as an attempt to gently, but seriously, push on our sense of what 
social life is, on where it might be sought, and on what kinds of action and practice might be 
organized under its sign. I am not claiming that our project, barely described here, has invented 
anything new, or that it is profoundly novel, or that it is the sociological equivalent of deep ocean 
microbiology. I am suggesting that its empirical assumptions and techniques (and it is far from 
alone in this) nonetheless arrange social life as an assemblage that now is as amenable to app-
mediated psychological self-ratings as it is to ethnographic field-notes, and epidemiological 
surveys, and perhaps even, in future work, to direct biological measures. And that, at least in the 
sense of a reproductive-futurist sociology, and the limited temporal horizons within which it 
makes sense of itself, this places our project at the limit, perhaps even beyond the limit, of what 
counts as normal science. This is sociological method, in other words, that proceeds in the hope 
of a more ambitious procedure for confronting the epistemological conundrum with which I 
started – a procedure for thinking the material transformations of the present not as a cause for 
alarm, nor the sign of crisis, nor the absence of a future, nor still a premonition of death. But 
rather as a nudge to think less conventionally about just these kinds of binaries; even to let go 
the sense of doom, to dial down the panic, to breathe in the forest air, to be calm.   
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i
 According to Google Scholar, the paper had been cited more than 800 times by May 2017, while two successor 
papers (Savage and Burrows, 2009; Burrows and Savage, 2014) had between them amassed more than 300 more. 
ii I am grateful to a review of the paper for this neat formulation. 
iii Mike “aǀage͛s Identities and Social Change in Britain since 1940 (2010), which was published a couple of years 
after this paper, is inter alia a piercing analysis of the history of British sociology in these terms. 
iv In their follow-up, Burrows and Savage take the opportunity to trace some of the methodological developments 
that have taken place since. A subsequent, large-sĐale data pƌojeĐt, the ͚Great Bƌitish Class “uƌǀeǇ,͛ is theiƌ ĐeŶtƌal 
example, although, as they admit, this has run into some method-trouble of its own: see Mills C. (2014) The Great 
British Class Fiasco: A Comment on Savage et al. Sociology-the Journal of the British Sociological Association 48(3): 
437-444. For Savage and Burrows, the work of recalling their 2007 paper is thus the work of tracing the 
methodological developments that it either predicted or anticipated. The way to read the paper, now, for them, is 
as an account of the methodological future—a guide to developments in (mostly quantitative) research innovation 
that have been taken, could have been taken, or might still be taken, in the years since. 
v I doŶ͛t iŶteŶd this oďseƌǀatioŶ as a ǁaǇ of ĐastigatiŶg aŶǇoŶe iŶǀolǀed iŶ these deďates. Let she oƌ he ǁho is 
innocent of career-making cast the first stone! 
vi I am grateful to an audience at CRAASH, at the University of Cambridge, and especially to Sarah Franklin, for 
helping me to foreground reproduction in my reading of these texts. 
vii It is ǁoƌth ŶotiŶg that BaĐk͛s papeƌ, ǁhile it Đoŵes iŶ the ǁake of the ŵethodologiĐal aŶǆietǇ oĐĐasioŶed ďǇ 
Savage and Burrows, and it addresses that papeƌ sƋuaƌelǇ iŶ its opeŶiŶg liŶes, is haƌdlǇ a diƌeĐt ͚ƌespoŶse͛ to 
“aǀage aŶd Buƌƌoǁs. IŶ faĐt, suĐh a desĐƌiptioŶ does sĐaŶt justiĐe to BaĐk͛s ƌiĐh aŶd ǁide-ranging paper, which I 
am treating somewhat narrowly here for my own ends. 
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viii And, indeed, the important essays that come before and after it, in what is in fact a special monograph issue of 
The Sociological Review dediĐated to ͚Liǀe Methods,͛ Đo-edited by Les Back and Nirmal Puwar 
ix And, further, that reading a paper through its metaphors produces a fairly skewed account of its argument. For 
the aǀoidaŶĐe of douďt: I doŶ͛t thiŶk that Mike “aǀage aŶd ‘ogeƌ Buƌƌoǁs aƌe of the opiŶioŶ that soĐiologǇ ǁill 
literally die, or that Les Back advocates burying texts underground. I am reading against the grain here, and so 
encourage the reader not familiar with these texts to not simply follow my reading, which I am sure many would 
regard as eccentric.  
x BaĐk͛s The Art of Listening (2007) contains, among other things, a rich and vivid account of tattoos as particular 
forms of political and affective inscription, while The Auditory Cultures Reader (2003), co-edited with Michael Bull, 
is a compelling call for attention to the ear as a piece of sociological apparatus.   
xi WhiĐh is Ŷot to saǇ, of Đouƌse, that ͚the soĐial͛ ǁas takeŶ as aŶ uŶpƌoďleŵatiĐallǇ ahistoƌiĐal ĐategoƌǇ pƌeǀiouslǇ 
– see Donzelot J. (1988) The promotion of the social. Economy and Society 17(3): 395-427. e.g. Donzelot, 1988) - 
but only to say that (1) it seems fairly undeniable, now, that technological and other changes have produced fairly 
obvious mutations in where and how social life takes place, and that (2) these changes have produced a discussion 
on the nature of the social right on the surface of the contemporary social sciences (in addition to the papers I 
discuss in the main article. See Couldry N. (2012) Media, society, world : social theory and digital media practice, 
Cambridge: Polity, Rose NS. (1999) Governing the soul : the shaping of the private self, London; New York: Free 
Association Books) 
xii It is perhaps worth noting in passing that the Rockefeller Foundation has its own history of helping to negotiate 
the line between the social and the biological in twentieth-century British social science. See Renwick C. (2014) 
Completing the Circle of the Social Sciences? William Beveridge and Social Biology at London School of Economics 
during the 1930s. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44(4): 478-496. 
xiii For an account of the historical geographies of psychiatry and psychopharmacology at stake here, see Callard F. 
(2016) The Intimate Geographies of Panic Disorder: Parsing Anxiety through Psychopharmacological Dissection. 
Osiris 31(1): 203-226. 
xiv See https://bcalm.co/ 
xv https://bcalm.co/how-it-works/. Accessed December 2017.  
xvi
 But see Lewis ;ϮϬϭϳͿ foƌ aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt ĐƌitiĐal ƌeadiŶg of the ƌepƌoduĐtiǀe tƌouďle of HaƌaǁaǇ͛s ƌeĐeŶt ǁƌitiŶg,  
xvii https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/sshm/research/Research-Groups/BIOS/BIOS-Projects/M3/About-
Us.aspx 
 
 
 
